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Abstract: This paper addresses the fundamental reason for the crisis of democracy in Spain, which is 
closely linked to the most important problem that also faces Europe today. I refer to the consequences of 
continuing to justify different political practices through the use of the concept of the nation-State. These 
pages seek rather to analyze that concept to try to explain its ambivalence than to tell the story of its 
emergence and development. I then propose, through Hegel and especially against Fichte, to establish a 
new concept, able to avoid the shortcomings of the previous one, which would require us to understand 
differently the relationship between the two elements, State and nation, which compose it. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Although we face many problems today, whether economic or political, the fact 
is that for the former a solution will be found sooner or later, while the latter pose more 
substantial difficulties. This is the reason why in this work we will focus on only one of 
these, the question that can be considered as the most important legal and political 
problem that democracy in Spain has to confront. It is directly interwoven with the use, 
the misuse, of the concept of the nation-State. It is true that this concept served to 
ground and settle modern European States. However, that same concept has allowed 
today a reverse path to be initiated, to the extent that new States claim to be based on it, 
the so-called Europe of the nations. Both paths, both the initial one of traditional nation-
States, as well as the new one  of the nations that are calling for a State of their own 
have the same philosophical and political basis: the nation-State concept. 
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It is desirable, therefore, to reflect on that concept, to the extent that both 
practices are justified by it. This will lead us to ask the reason for this ambiguity and the 
possibility of escaping from it. To do this we must deconstruct this concept and 
understand the mechanism of its working, which will enable us to emphasize that, from 
the moment that its two elements, State and nation, settled on a universality that 
responds in each case, whether nation or State, to different foundations. The use of both 
together is founded on a double universality that ends up being contradictory and very 
sensitive. 
 
II. THE NATION-STATE CONCEPT 
 
To properly understand the complexity of the nation-State concept, I think it 
would be wise to compare it with nitroglycerin, a powerful but very unstable explosive. 
This is why despite having a huge capacity to demolish, its use never became 
widespread. The nation-State concept also has an enormous capacity for destruction. It 
was used to blow up the late medieval order and build the modern world. It looks like 
nitroglycerin because its killing efficiency is enormous, but, like it, it seems very 
sensitive. Thus the same should have happened to the concept of the nation-State as 
happened with nitroglycerin; it should have stopped being used given its drawbacks. 
However, that has not happened, its use has not decreased, but on the contrary, the 
concept of nation-State continues to occupy a central place. In fact an important part of 
the major problems that Europe has experienced since the establishment of the Peace of 
Westphalia, have been related to the nature of the instability of the nation-State concept. 
Our own political life is governed by the imbalances that start from the crucial role that 
that concept plays in it. 
 
Nitroglycerin stopped being used because new materials were found that ensured 
the same capacity, while avoiding its shortcomings, the derivatives of its instability. In 
the legal-political field, however, we have been unable to find a new concept that would 
have enabled us to replace the previous one. I think the reason for this failure is that we 
have not managed to analyse its components consistently. This would have allowed us 
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to understand it exactly and therefore be able to replace any of its elements or to alter its 
composition so that the same disadvantages would have been avoided. 
 
In this paper I will not stop to highlight the great advantages of its use. We only 
need to recall what happened in European history for three centuries. Neither shall I 
dwell on the negative consequences of its use. In this case we do not even need to look 
backwards, it is enough take a closer or further look around us. The attempt to disrupt 
our democratic State, the Europe of States, and replace it for who knows how many, the 
Europe of nations, would be a sufficient sample. Here I am only concerned with the 
analysis of that concept in order to understand the reasons for its instability. If we do so, 
then it would be possible to replace it with a better designed concept to avoid the 
defects of the former. In short, we would be repeating in the legal-political sphere what 
happened with the replacement of nitroglycerin by dynamite. 
 
In The Essence and Value of Democracy
2
, Kelsen reflected on the need for all 
States to be built on a nation, that is, on the identity of language and culture among its 
members. He thus recounted the difficulties of his time, the collapse of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire, and the foundations on which the legal-political order would have to 
be built to avoid those problems that ended up by destroying the Central European 
order. Kelsen supported his arguments on the ideas of Kant and Fichte, even though he 
did not go beyond them. To do that, he would have had to take into account the 
reflections of Hegel. 
 
Kant wrote against Hobbes and his conception of the social contract. According 
to Kant, the social contract is the union of a group of individuals in order to form a 
society. To do so they established a civil constitution. Until here he does not differ from 
Hobbes, although he would do so when he maintained that 
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"[That union...] is to be found in a society only insofar as it is in the civil 
condition, that is, constitutes a commonwealth"
3
 
 
Thus, the civil constitution is a necessary step, but has to be given on something 
prior, the commonwealth, which he describes "as the maternal womb"
4
, and we can 
easily understand it as a commonwealth of language and culture. Fichte went more 
deeply into Kant's position in a certain way and Hegel would do precisely the opposite, 
because while for Fichte that social life is built on the commonwealth, subordinating the 
construction of the State to the former, in the case of Hegel it was the contrary. Fichte 
based his work on the primacy of the concept of nation, while Hegel did so on the State. 
 
In his Addresses to the German Nation
5
, Fichte had argued that 
 
"People and fatherland [...] as carriers and guarantors of earthly eternity 
and as something that can last forever here on earth, they are something 
that is above the State [...] they are above the social order"
6
 
 
The consequences of such assertions are obvious. First, Fichte argues that "the 
love of the fatherland should govern the State itself"
7
, so that "the burning flame of 
superior love of fatherland that understands the nation as the wrapping of the eternal and 
to which the noble surrenders himself with joy and to which the not noble, that is only 
there for [“civic”] love [“to the constitution and laws"], must be surrended himself likes 
it or not."
8
 Thus, Fichte differentiates between love of fatherland, a higher love, typical 
of one who is noble in character, and civic love, typical of one who does not possess 
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that nobility, that is, love of the constitution and the laws, which is necessarily subjected 
to the first. 
 
III. THE CONCEPT OF NATION 
 
Against Fichte's position in which the nation plays a central role through its link 
to the eternal, Hegel argues that the universality of the nation does not exceed its 
immediacy, while the universality of the State does. The first is based on the common, 
which corresponds to a superficial universality,
9
 the second is appropriate of the general 
will, ‘the will’s rationality in and for itself’, and its reality will take place in the State. In 
short, Hegel turns Fichte around. Now the State acquires a central and not merely 
instrumental role. To support this position, Hegel develops in the Phenomenology of 
Spirit a brief, but very complex argument which I shall now explain. 
 
In relation to the concept of nation he says its universality, which is first and 
superficial, is built on the language [die Sprache]. This is an externalization of spirit as 
the spirit of the people that sheds its particularity. Thus the people cease to be aware of 
this, the particularity, at that, the spirit, to be aware of the universality of human 
existence, a universality that is reached in language. 
 
The awareness that a particular spirit of the people acquires from the universality 
of human existence can only be achieved through unity, which dwells only in the house 
that language represents. Hegel speaks of the spirit of the people and of this spirit 
insofar as it becomes conscious of itself, which can only happen when unity is achieved 
by the particular spirits of the peoples, that is, when grouped in the unity that language 
entails, since the spirit of the people, if it is to become aware, has to do so in language. 
In other words, when the spirit of the people acquires its awareness, the particularity is 
exceeded in the unity of language, around which it becomes the essence of a specific 
people, which is necessarily universal, which is characteristic of all humanity. 
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It is true that Hegel has so far only used the concept of people [Volk] and spirit 
of the people [Geist des Volks and Volkgeist]. Moreover, the Spanish translation fits his 
requirements. However, the English translation handles the terms as nation, national 
spirit and spirit of the nation, which apparently is disrespectful, but I think in essence it 
is more accurate, because in this translation we can glimpse what Hegel himself is 
looking for and will reveal when he conceptualizes the nation as the result of the 
common undertaking of all, which is nothing but the form that the reality of a particular 
spirit of the people reaches insofar as it is sensed as the universal humanity, which is 
achieved through the universality of language. 
 
It would only be necessary, for now, that to build that common undertaking 
around which all come together and constitute a nation, Hegel says it requires the 
formation of a "Gesamtvolk” and therefore a “Gesamthimmel”. That is, this common 
work of which the nation consists, requires a rigorous unity, which claims the formation 
of a 'total', 'complete', people with a goal equally 'total', 'complete', implicit 
requirements in all the work that we want to consider as common. If Hegel had stayed 
here, he would have left his concept of nation blocked, it would have been simply 
limited to the immediacy of a single people, however complete it may have been 
imagined. However, Hegel has in mind at the outset that after his concept of nationhood 
and unity of the common undertaking that this concept represents there is the possibility 
of achieving a more complex universality than that which can be achieved only when 
the spirit of the people is sensed as universal humanity in its reality through the unity 
that language represents and that is identified by the construction of the common 
purpose as its aim. Thus, the universality of the nation is but a first universality. Hegel 
says it clearly: 
 
"This universality to which Spirit in its existence attains, is, however, 
only this first universality which first issues from the individuality of the 
ethical sphere”.10 
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Clearly, this first universality is not yet a State, but both realities, the reality of 
the nation and of the State, are embodied in the ethical sphere, because the ethical 
character of the real spirit of a people is based both on that -“the immediate trust of the 
individuals in their nation as a whole”-, as on this, the State, to the extent that 
individuals not merely express that confidence, but participate in "the decisions and 
actions of the government”11, which necessarily requires a State structure. It seems as if 
two transformations occurred in succession. First, the one that happened in a group of 
individuals through the common task in an entire people, in which we already find an 
ethical spirit, that however, goes beyond that concept of people, since the ethical 
character of the spirit of the people is based on the trust of individuals toward the 
totality of their people, which at the same time goes beyond the immediacy represented 
by this first universality to the extent that ethical spirit gravitates, secondly, on the 
participation of all, regardless of how such participation is structured, in the acts and 
decisions of government. That is, the ethical spirit in which the first universality is 
based also is extended to a second universality, which is the appropriate of the 
government of all the people. 
 
IV. THE CONCEPT OF STATE 
 
Hegel does not say much about the concept of State in Phenomenology, although 
what he does say is fully relevant. He had spoken first of overcoming the particularity 
of a people in its universality, even it were a universality that was rooted in the 
immediacy of the unity represented by language. Now he builds a new duality. He 
considers that the concept of people can be approached from two perspectives, first, that 
"of the State, or Demos”12 that is, of its universality and, secondly, "the individuality of 
the Family"
13
, that is, its particularity, leaving universality strictly as an appropriate 
feature of demos. 
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Hegel now plays with the ambivalence of the concept of people, which is 
understood as demos, but also as something singular, particular. The first grounds the 
idea of sovereignty, the second builds on the particular aspect of a specific people. He 
speaks of the demos as universal mass, opinion of itself, necessity and universality. 
These characteristics he opposes to those with which he characterizes the concept of 
people as particularity, such as its immediate existence, contingent and vulgar. When he 
thought of the concept of nation, he did it by distinguishing it for its universality, 
although immediate, of the particularity of a specific people; now he speaks of the 
people as demos, thus building a universality unlike that of the character of the nation, 
because it is a political universality, which the concept of sovereignty requires. Thus, 
Hegel establishes a central difference between demos and nation, for while all trace of 
immediacy has disappeared from the former, in the latter, the concept of nation, its 
universality remains subject to the immediate. This is what allows him to characterize, 
according to Dilthey, "the great modern States" like those that "embraced, like in its 
time the Roman Empire, peoples of different origin, language, religion and different 
cultures. The weight of all and the spirit and art of the State organization operated this 
connection, so that inequalities of culture and customs are a necessary product and, at 
the same time, an equally necessary condition for modern States to be able to subsist”14. 
In other words, the State needs the nation, but the nation needs the State and not merely 
a national State. This is precisely where the risk of such a concept is found, to the extent 
that one of its aspects predominates over the other. If the universality of the State 
prevails, we will fall into abstraction and the problems that this entails; if what prevails 
is the contingency and immediacy of the second, we will fall, as Hegel warned, into 
vulgarity. 
 
In fact, Hegel thought of the concept of nation in the same way as Fichte, 
although the former considers it inadequate and tried to go beyond the Addresses to the 
German Nation. This leads him to raise two key issues in building a State, the problem 
of its grounding and that of its foundation. The first he would resolve, contrary to 
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Rousseau, by building a general will -"the will’s rationality in and for itself"15- which 
differs from Rousseau’s common will, in which "[t]he union of individuals within the 
State thus becomes a contract, which is accordingly based on their arbitrary will and 
opinions, and on their express consent given at their own discretion"
16
. Regarding the 
question of the foundation, Hegel argues, in agreement with Kant, about the complex 
institutionalization of a sovereign, to the extent that people have their voice in that of a 
constitutional monarch which ensures its unity. The State is erected on this. 
 
To solve the first problem, that of the grounding, Hegel states, as we have seen, 
a difference between the common [Gemein] and the general [Allgemein]. This 
divergence had been much more clearly established in The Constitution of Germany, in 
which Hegel defended the difference between the need required for political power and 
the appropriate contingency of a social union of a people. Hence he maintained that 
 
“[A] multitude of human beings can only be called a State if it is united 
for the common defence of the totality [Gesamtheit] of its property [... 
that is, for] a multitude to constitute a State, it is necessary to organize a 
common defence and political authority”17. 
 
Hegel considers political authority "as pure State law,"
18
 which enables him to 
differentiate between what is necessary for political authority, which "has to [be] 
directly determined by it"
19
 and what is "merely necessary for the social union of a 
people "
20
, which from the point of view of political authority is contingent. So he 
argues that the State, as a "universal society"
21
, leaves a "free hand to the general 
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subordinate action"
22
 and not in what is properly general. Thus he can defend the 
possibility that 
 
"there is a very superficial connection, if any, between the members [of a 
State], in consideration of customs, education and language; therefore, 
the identity that formerly constituted the backbone of the union of a 
people, must be considered now as an accident whose characteristics do 
not prevent a mass from forming a political power"
23
. 
 
Thus, the State or the construction of political power is only possible if it is built 
on the universality appropriate to the demos, which is neither accidental nor contingent 
but goes beyond the particularity of any people, while at the same time allowing a 
variety of identities to coexist within that political power. Therefore he argues that in 
the modern State being identical in language, customs, education and religion is 
superfluous, because it has the ability to impose the same result 
 
"through the spirit and art of political organization; with the result that 
inequalities of culture and customs is so much a necessary product as an 
essential prerequisite for the stability of modern States"
24
. 
 
In this way Hegel had solved the problem posed by Rousseau when building a 
political authority that goes beyond the immediacy of the common, at the same time he 
protects the very identities of that particularity. Nevertheless, the building will not be 
completed until its own closing is inserted in it. To do this will, he will follow Kant, as 
mentioned before, when discussing the need for the 
 
"Political authority, as government, h[as] to concentrate on a central 
point [...] If the centre itself is safe, thanks to deep popular respect [...] 
then, a public authority can leave freely, without fear and without 
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misgivings, to the care of systems and subordinate bodies, much of the 
relations arising in society, as well as its conservation according to the 
laws; so that each State, city, village, community, etc., can enjoy freedom 
doing and executing that which belongs to its level."
25
 
 
If we understand the central point not as the constitutional monarch, but rather as 
'we the people'; if we understand its universality as necessary and not contingent, that is, 
the people as sovereign, we shall be able to solve our problem, if we truly understand 
that. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The conclusion to which we shall necessarily arrive is that of the justification of 
a democratic and multinational State, that is, a State with one sovereign, in our case, the 
people, articulated through its cultural and linguistic differences. This is the idea that 
Hegel has defended in The Constitution of Germany and in the Phenomenology of 
Spirit. With this he understands Kant in a radically different manner from how Fichte 
had done and solves the problem that we face, at least theoretically. It does not seem 
from a rational point of view that better principles can be raised than those that are 
established by those characteristics of a legal and political order appropriate to the 
constitutional State, which ensures not only the rights and freedoms of individuals; but 
also their own signs of identity through recognition of the rights to the preservation of 
their own culture and language. The discrepancy with Kelsen is clear, it is not that these 
differences in national character are those that have to ensure the construction of its own 
State, rather it is the State that guarantees the survival of such identities. In this way we 
avoid building a State attached to the immediacy of national characteristics and we 
could erect a State grounded on rational principles; therefore it would strengthen not 
only a first universality, based on naturalness, but a more complex universality 
appropriate to a State that goes beyond the immediacy of a certain culture and language. 
 
                                                 
25
 Hegel, La Constitución…, op. cit., pp. 30-31.  
JOSÉ J. JIMÉNEZ SÁNCHEZ 
The Age of Human Rights Journal, 5 (December 2015) pp. 50-62    ISSN: 2340-9592 
 
61 
However, we should not forget the saying that asserts "that may be correct in 
theory, but it is of no use in practice”26. Attempts by peripheral nationalisms to 
transform "the State of the autonomies [...] into the autonomy of the States"
27
 shows the 
problem to which I refer, that our democracy "will only be definitively consolidated the 
day on which the question of [those ...] nationalisms [...] is resolved"
28
. True, we might 
think, following Kant
29
, that if we are not able to apply that theory that seems the most 
rational of all, the difficulty does not lie in the practice but in the failure of the theory 
itself. Nevertheless, this does not seem to be the case. Hegel put it very well when he 
spoke of Napoleon’s failure in Spain30. His ideas were more advanced, more rational, 
but that does not mean that they could then be exploited, it is when they were applied 
that the failure was evident. Something similar could happen in our country now. Trying 
to use the theory of the multinational State in the present circumstances would certainly 
lead to the destruction of the democratic system. This is an idea that will require a long 
time to be assimilated and practiced, since if it is carried out at this time, every nation, 
every supposed nation would claim its own State, when the application of such a theory 
would only make sense from loyalty to a general will, 'the will’s rationality in and for 
itself', which would embody the universal interest and not the irrational interests, 
because particular, of the different nations. 
 
Thus, then, there has developed a whole theory, but it seems that we are 
incapable of putting it into practice. The United States of America was built on the 
brilliant invention of a sovereign, 'we the people', and the acceptance of thirteen States 
who assumed the dissolution of their own sovereignty in that of the new sovereign. In 
our case, we should have to understand it similarly, although not identically, since it is a 
                                                 
26
 Kant, “On the common…”, op. cit., p. 277. 
27
 J. Semprún, Federico Sánchez se despide de ustedes, Tusquets, Barcelona, 2010 (1993), p. 122. 
28
 Semprún, Federico Sánchez…, op. cit., p. 132 
29
 Kant had argued “everything in moral philosophy that is correct for theory must also hold for practice” 
(“On the common…, op. cit., p. 289), that is, what was correct in theory, would also have to be so in 
practice. Therefore, “it was not the fault of theory if it was of little use in practice, but rather of there 
having been not enough theory, which the man in question should have learned from experience” (Kant, 
“On the common…, op. cit., p. 279). 
30
 “Napoleon, for example, tried to give the Spanish a constitution a priori, but the consequences were 
bad enough. For a a constitution is not simply made: it is the work of centuries, the Idea and the 
Consciouness of the rational, insofar as that Consciouness has developed in a nation [Volk]” in Hegel, 
Elements…, op. cit., addition, paragraph 274, pp. 312-313.  
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question of maintaining a single sovereign in a State with a national diversity 
understood as a multiplicity of identities. The problem is that we confuse identity with 
sovereignty, that is, we perceive the nations as sovereigns. Precisely, this is what can be 
glimpsed in the debate in which we find ourselves, although at times it is even worse, 
because we do not even understand the appropriate concept of sovereignty. 
 
Nor should we again pursue the aim of being the test in resolving European 
problems. As almost always we should wait for Europe to be the solution, as these ideas 
take their place there. The economic crisis has brought to the surface the European evil, 
the resurgence of nationalisms with and without States. Claims for their own State, by 
some, as well as the claim of lost sovereignty -legislative, territorial, monetary and 
economic-, by others, show more than the crisis of the nation-State concept, their full 
consecration, for those and these try to assert it. The crisis is rather that of the concept 
of sovereignty, that is, the pre-eminence of the State, which shows the inability to 
articulate some practices which, just as Edmund Husserl called for in 1935, would lead 
to the construction of Europe as a "supra-nationality of an entirely new type"
31
 and 
therefore of a European sovereign. 
 
In this situation it seems clear that it would not be very sensible to set out on a 
path in our country, that although correct from a theoretical point of view, we must 
recognize that at least in Europe it fails at the present time. Therefore rather than the 
realization of the theory we should, against Kant, call for caution and limit, according to 
Hegel, our desire for change to the mere reforms to the existing situation without 
attempting to achieve what might be correct in theory, but is now inapplicable in 
practice. 
 
                                                 
31
Cited in Semprún, Federico Sánchez…, op. cit., p. 237  
